When Fear Became Policy in Tajikistan

Introduction

These fears cannot simply be dismissed as inventions. Tajikistan endured a devastating civil war in the 1990s, and Tajik nationals have subsequently joined violent extremist organisations or carried out terrorist attacks. Yet international observers argue that genuine security concerns have often been stretched into a much broader social scare. Peaceful opposition politicians, ordinary worshippers, religious minorities, people with beards or headscarves, and traditional healers have all been treated as possible signs of dangerous disloyalty. The most useful question is therefore not whether Tajikistan has experienced “mass hysteria”, but how fear has been organised, amplified and turned into policy.[un.org]tajikistan.un.orgThe United Nations in TajikistanUN expert urges Tajikistan to leave past behind and…20 Apr 2023 — “I urge the authorities to look beyo…

Why fear of religion carries such force

Modern Tajikistan emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991 and descended into civil war the following year. The conflict involved regional, political, democratic, nationalist and Islamist factions rather than a simple contest between secularism and religious fundamentalism. Its 1997 peace settlement gave the opposition a recognised place in public life, including legal status for the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, commonly known as the IRPT.

That history matters because the government of President Emomali Rahmon has repeatedly presented tight control as protection against a return to chaos. Violent Islamist organisations have operated in or recruited from the wider region, and terrorist violence involving Tajik citizens is real. In 2018, for example, attackers killed four foreign cyclists in southern Tajikistan; the Islamic State group claimed responsibility, while the government also accused the banned IRPT, which denied involvement. More recently, Tajik suspects were linked to the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack near Moscow, intensifying anxiety about radicalisation among migrants.[Time]time.comTajikistan Blames Banned Islamist Party for Attack That Killed Two AmericansThe assailants, who appeared to deliberately target the cyclists, used a car to run them over before attacking them with weapons. The Taj…

The problem is the widening of the category. “Extremism” in Tajik public policy has come to cover far more than planning or supporting violence. Human-rights monitors and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief have criticised laws and administrative practices that treat unapproved religious education, peaceful association, clothing, publications and political dissent as potential security matters. Following a 2023 visit, the Special Rapporteur urged officials to move beyond a near-exclusive concern with terrorism and recognise that religion itself is not a social danger.[The United Nations in Tajikistan]tajikistan.un.orgThe United Nations in TajikistanUN expert urges Tajikistan to leave past behind and…20 Apr 2023 — “I urge the authorities to look beyo…

This resembles a moral panic when the feared category becomes elastic: a limited danger is used to explain a much larger range of behaviour, while visible symbols stand in for evidence of harmful intent. It does not mean that every security case is false. It means that the boundary between violent extremism, conservative belief, opposition politics and ordinary religious life has repeatedly been blurred.

The making of the religious “folk devil”

A central episode was the destruction of the IRPT as a legal political force in 2015. The party had participated in the post-war political settlement and had operated legally for roughly 15 years. After losing its final parliamentary seats, it faced mounting pressure, closure and then designation as an extremist and terrorist organisation. Officials linked it to an armed revolt led by former deputy defence minister Abdukhalim Nazarzoda; the party rejected the accusation. Large numbers of members and lawyers connected with the case received long prison sentences.[occrp.org]occrp.orgthe death of tajikistans islamic renaissanceThe Death of Tajikistan's Islamic RenaissanceIn the summer of 2015, using a combination of arrest, intimidation, and propaganda, Pre…

The government described the measures as necessary defence against a coup and political Islam. Critics saw a campaign in which propaganda, intimidation and broad allegations converted the country’s main opposition party into a symbol of treachery. European and international observers questioned whether the ban had been supported by credible, openly testable evidence and warned that eliminating lawful political competition could itself increase instability.[OCCRP]occrp.orgthe death of tajikistans islamic renaissanceThe Death of Tajikistan's Islamic RenaissanceIn the summer of 2015, using a combination of arrest, intimidation, and propaganda, Pre…

The consequences extended beyond party officials. “Extremist” became a powerful label that could attach to relatives, lawyers, journalists, online commentators and people accused of viewing or sharing prohibited material. In May 2025, Tajikistan removed criminal liability for merely “liking” social-media posts deemed extremist, an implicit acknowledgement that previous rules had swept extraordinarily minor behaviour into the security system.[Reuters]reuters.comTajikistan decriminalises 'liking' social media postsTajikistan decriminalises 'liking' social media posts

Religious minorities have also been framed through the language of suspicious sects and foreign influence. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been banned since 2007, while Protestant communities and independent Muslim groups have faced registration problems, raids or allegations of unlawful religious activity. The word “cult” is misleading here unless it is presented as somebody’s accusation: these are established religious communities, and the central historical issue is how official language can make minority belief appear inherently secretive or threatening.[eurasianet.org]eurasianet.orgtajikistan in dushanbe religious radicalism comes in many formstajikistan in dushanbe religious radicalism comes in many forms

A related pattern has affected the predominantly Ismaili Pamiri population of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. After protests and a violent security operation in May 2022, authorities arrested activists, journalists and community figures and tightened control over local institutions. Rights organisations describe the campaign as collective repression of an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority, rather than a narrowly targeted response to identifiable crimes.[amnesty.org]amnesty.orgOpen source on amnesty.org.

When clothing and appearance become evidence

Few examples show the mechanics of Tajikistan’s social scares more clearly than official campaigns against Islamic dress and beards. For years, women wearing particular head coverings reported pressure from police, universities and employers, although officials sometimes acknowledged that no explicit national ban existed. Men with long beards were stopped, photographed, refused documents or compelled to shave. Human Rights Watch reported estimates that thousands of men had been forcibly shaved during one major campaign.[hrw.org]hrw.orgHuman Rights Watch Tajikistan's Fight Against Political IslamHuman Rights Watch Tajikistan's Fight Against Political Islam

These practices turned appearance into a diagnostic tool. A beard or headscarf could be interpreted not simply as fashion or devotion but as an outward trace of foreign ideology. Such reasoning is characteristic of moral panic: complicated questions about politics, migration, inequality and radicalisation are condensed into a visible symbol that officials can count, remove or prohibit.

In June 2024, Tajikistan formalised much of this approach by prohibiting clothing described as “alien to national culture”. The wording did not name the hijab directly, but officials had long used similar language for forms of Islamic dress. The law also promoted a state-approved vision of national clothing and linked regulation of appearance with the defence of culture, the prevention of superstition and the struggle against extremism. United Nations experts subsequently raised concerns that the amended law imposed excessive restrictions on cultural and religious expression.[rferl.org]rferl.orgOpen source on rferl.org.

The campaign is not best understood as a spontaneous public panic. It has largely flowed downward from government speeches, legislation, schools, police and state-backed religious bodies. Nor is it a simple conflict between secular people and believers. The authorities promote a carefully managed form of national religion while opposing practices considered foreign, politically independent or beyond administrative control.

This produces an important paradox. Tajikistan is a Muslim-majority country in which the state seeks to define which Islamic practices are authentically national. The feared outsider is therefore often not another religion but a supposedly imported version of the majority faith. Clothing becomes a battlefield over who has the authority to define national identity.

Fortune-tellers, healers and a modern witch scare

Tajikistan’s campaigns against fortune-tellers and traditional healers come closest to a recognisable witch panic, although there have not been witch trials in the classic early-modern sense. Fortune-telling has been prohibited since 2008, but enforcement escalated dramatically in 2024. Police detained large numbers of practitioners, registered healers and clients, confiscated ritual objects and publicised cases through official and local media. Penalties were increased, with repeat offences potentially leading to heavy fines or imprisonment.[rferl.org]rferl.orgOpen source on rferl.org.

The people targeted form no single movement. Some claim to predict the future. Some offer prayers, charms or relationship advice. Others provide traditional or religious healing, sometimes alongside ordinary herbal treatments. Clients may seek help with illness, marriage, court cases, employment or business. It would therefore be inaccurate to describe them collectively as a cult or organised occult network.[RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty]rferl.orgOpen source on rferl.org.

Officials and supporters of the crackdown offer several arguments. Untrained healers may discourage patients from seeking medical care. Practitioners may exploit distressed families, demand large payments or commit fraud. Religious authorities can also condemn fortune-telling as incompatible with Islam. These concerns are not imaginary, and fraudulent treatment can cause genuine harm.

Yet the campaign has moved beyond prosecuting demonstrable fraud. Police have compiled registers of practitioners and customers, broadcast confessions and treated the entire field as a social contaminant. President Rahmon has publicly attacked superstition and practices said to exploit citizens. The result is a classic fusion of rational reform language with the theatre of a purge: named offenders, confiscated objects, public humiliation and an expansive category of suspicious belief.[RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty]rferl.orgOpen source on rferl.org.

Economic and emotional pressures help explain why the services persist. Tajikistan has experienced poverty, extensive labour migration, strained health provision and the long psychological aftermath of civil war. In such conditions, healers and diviners may provide reassurance, culturally familiar explanations and a sense of agency when formal institutions appear distant or unaffordable. Their popularity is not proof that clients share a coherent supernatural worldview; people commonly combine religious practice, medical treatment and folk remedies without seeing any contradiction.

The strongest interpretation is therefore neither “the witches were real” nor “the public became irrational”. The episode is better understood as a struggle over authority. The state, licensed doctors, approved clergy and informal practitioners compete to explain misfortune and decide which remedies count as legitimate. A recent academic comparison with historical witch hunts argues that healers have become convenient figures through whom the state can condemn disorder, backwardness and uncontrolled religious practice. That comparison is suggestive rather than definitive, but it captures the campaign’s scapegoating potential.[NomadIT]nomadit.co.ukOpen source on nomadit.co.uk.

Panic, persecution or genuine danger?

Tajikistan’s history requires distinctions that sensational accounts often erase.

Violent extremism is real. Tajik citizens have joined armed organisations, and attacks have killed civilians. Poverty, political exclusion, migrant insecurity and online recruitment may all contribute to radicalisation. Treating every warning about terrorism as fabricated would ignore victims and obscure serious security problems.[Reuters]reuters.comFollowing a deadly attack by Islamist militants from Tajikistan in Moscow, hostility towards Central Asian migrant workers has increased…

Ordinary piety is not evidence of violence. A headscarf, beard, private religious lesson or minority affiliation does not establish extremist intent. When such markers are treated as warning signs, the response risks producing fear of an identity rather than investigation of conduct.

Traditional healing is not one thing. It can include harmless ritual, social support, herbal knowledge, false medical claims or deliberate fraud. Effective consumer protection depends on distinguishing these activities rather than criminalising an entire cultural field.

State repression is not mass psychogenic illness. There is no strong evidence of a major Tajik outbreak in which physical symptoms spread through a group without an identifiable organic cause. Using “mass hysteria” for political crackdowns would confuse a medical and psychological phenomenon with propaganda, coercion and moral regulation.

Official narratives are not automatically false. The more precise criticism is that vague law and secretive proceedings make claims difficult to evaluate. When courts operate without transparency and the media cannot investigate freely, rumours and official allegations may reinforce one another rather than being tested against independent evidence.

Why these scares endure

The recurring fears in Tajikistan cluster around three unresolved problems: memories of civil war, uncertainty about national identity after Soviet rule, and the concentration of political power. Each provides a reason for officials and citizens to value order. Together, however, they also make it easy to portray difference as the first stage of catastrophe.

The civil war supplies an emotionally powerful warning: political and religious pluralism can be described as a road back to bloodshed. Nation-building supplies a visual answer: approved language, ceremonies and clothing can be presented as protection against foreign influence. Authoritarian government supplies the machinery: schools, police, courts, television and religious regulators can turn these ideas into everyday rules.

Media conditions matter as well. In an environment where independent reporting is restricted, accusations of extremism, sorcery or cultural disloyalty are difficult to challenge. Publicly televised confessions and official announcements create the impression of a hidden problem continually being uncovered. The campaign then appears to prove the danger that justified it: the more people detained, the larger the supposed threat must have been.

The human effects are substantial. Peaceful religious life becomes more private and anxious. Families may fear guilt by association. Women’s clothing and men’s grooming become matters of police attention. Pamiri identity and opposition politics can be treated as security concerns. People seeking help from healers may be driven underground rather than guided towards safe medical care.

Tajikistan’s most important lesson for the study of cult scares and collective fear is therefore about classification. A government does not need tales of demons, flying saucers or an approaching apocalypse to produce panic-like politics. It needs a persuasive threat, a flexible label and institutions capable of making that label visible everywhere. In Tajikistan, “extremist”, “alien”, “superstitious” and “sectarian” have repeatedly served that function.

The country’s history also cautions against the opposite mistake. Real terrorism does not validate indiscriminate repression, just as fraudulent healing does not make every folk practitioner a dangerous sorcerer. The central task is to separate demonstrable harm from symbolic suspicion. Where that separation collapses, campaigns presented as public protection can become engines of fear, conformity and persecution.

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Endnotes

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Additional References

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